We recently described a formalism for rea soning with if-then rules that are expressed with different levels of firmness [18] . The formalism interprets these rules as extreme conditional probability statements, specify ing orders of magnitude of disbelief, which impose const1·aints over possible rankings of worlds. It was shown that, once we compute a priority function z+ on the rules, the de gree to which a given query is confirmed or denied can be computed in O(lob rl.) proposi tional satisfiability tests, where n is the num ber of rules in the knowledge base. In this paper, we show that computing z+ requires O(n2 x logn) satisfiability tests, not an ex ponenti al number as was conjectured in [18] , which reduces to polynomial complexity in the case of Horn expressions. Vi'e also show how reasoning with imprecise observations can be incorporated in om formalism and how the popular notions of belief ret,ision and epistemic entrenchment are embodied natu rally and tractably. A simple way of viewing infinitesimal probabilities is to consider an ordinary probability function P defined over a set n of possible worlds (or states of the world) w and to imagine that the probability P(w) is a poly nomial function of some infinitesimal parameter <:, ar bitrarily close to, yet bigger than zero; for example 1 -c1t: or t:2-c2t:4• Accordingly, the probabilities as signed t.o any subset of n represented by a logical for mula t.p, as well as all conditional probabilities P('li'[!f'),
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Introduction: Infinitesimal
Probabilities, Rankin g s and
Common Sense Reasoning
The uncertainty encountered in com�r :·n sense reason ing fluctuates over an extremely wide range. For ex ample, the probability that the new book on my desk is about astrology is less than one in a million. If how ever, I spot a Zodiac sign on page 1. the probability becomes close to 1, say 0.999. Intelligent agents are expected to reason with such rare eventualities and to produce explanations and actions whenever these oc cur. Given this wide range of uncertainty fluctuations and the fact that the majority of everyday decisions in volve relatively low payoffs, the full precision of prob ability calculus may not be necessary, and a. n ordei'
of-magnitude approximation may be sufficient . Thus, instead of measuring probabilities on a scale from zero t.o one, we can imagine projecting probability measures onto a quantized logarithmic scale and then treating beliefs that map onto two different quanta as being of different orders of magnitude.
This method of approximation gives rise to a semi qualitative calculus of uncertainty, one in which de grees of ( dis)belief are ranked by non-negative integers (corresponding perhaps to linguistic quantifiers such as "believable," "unlikely," "very rare") still capable of accounting for retraction and restoration of beliefs by Bayesian conditionalization. The origin of this approx imation can be traced back to Ernest Adams [1] , who developed a logic of conditionals based on infinitesimal probabilities, and to the Ordinal Condition Functions of Spohn (29] . Potential applications in nonmonotonic reasoning were noted in [21, 23] and further developed in (20, 16, 25, 17, 18, 8] .
A simple way of viewing infinitesimal probabilities is to consider an ordinary probability function P defined over a set n of possible worlds (or states of the world) w and to imagine that the probability P(w) is a poly P(r/J A .p) = P(r/JI<p)P(\0)
Parameterizing a probability measure by c: and ex tracting the lowest exponent of c: as the measure of (dis)belief is proposed as a model of the process by which people abstract qualitative beliefs from numer ical probabilities and accept them as tentative truths. For example, we can make the following correspon dence between linguistic quantifiers and en: These approximations yield a probabilistically sound calculus, employing integer addition, fr,r manipulating the orders of magnitude of disbelief. The resulting formalism is governed by the following principles:
1. Each world is ranked by a non-negative integer K representing the degree of surprise associated with finding such a world.
Each well-formed formula (wff) is given the rank
of the world with the lowest �< (most normal world) that satisfies that formula.
3. Given a collection of facts¢, we say that 17 follows from ,P with strength 6 if 1;(17!¢) > 6, or, equiv alently, if the K rank of ¢ /\ -,17 is at least 6 + 1 degrees above that of ¢ /\ u.
Principles 1 and 2 follow immediately from the scman t�cs de � cribed � bove. Principle 3 says that 17 is plau Sible g1ven ¢ Iff ?(1711/J) 2:: 1 -cc6, where P is the c�parametri � ed probability associated with that par tlcular ra nkmg "-· This abstraction of probabilities matches the notion of plain belief in ,,l t at it is deduc tively closed;� . tl .
lC price we pay, however, is that many small probabthtles do not accumulate into a strong ar gument (as in the lottery paradox).
The ?asic K ranki � g system, as described in Spohn [29] , r � qmres the spenfi cation of a complete ranking func tiOn before reasoning can commence. In othe1· words, the knowledge base must be sufficiently rich to define the K associated with every world w. Unfortunatelv in practice, such specification is not readily availabl� · .
For example, we might be given the information that "birds � ormally fly" (written �.:(-.Jib) > 0) and no in f � rmatlOn whatsoever about the flying habits of red buds or non-birds. \Ve still would like to conclude that red birds normally fly, even though the information 2If A is believed and B is believed then AI\B is believed. �ate. that this deviates form the threshold conception of be lief: If both P ( A) and P( B) are above a certain threshold P( A 1\ B) may still be below that same threshold.
'
given is not sufficient for defining a complete ranking function. In order to draw plausible conclusions from such fragmentary pieces of information, we require ad ditional inferential machinery that should accomplish two functions: First, it should enrich the specification of the ranking function with the needed information and, second, it should operate directly on the speci fication sentences in the knowledge base, rather than on the rankings of worlds (which are too numerous to list). Such machinery is provided by a formalism called system-z+ [18] which accepts knowledge in the form of quantified if-then rules (e.g., "birds fly (with strength 6)") and computes the plausibility of any given query (e.g., "Tim, being a red-bird, flies (with degree 6')") by syntactic manipulation of these rules.
To accomplish these functions, system-z+ incorpo rates two principles in addition to those given above: 4. Each input rule "if r.p then '1/J ( with strength 6)," and [18] ). The first contribution of this paper is to improve the inference process of system-z+ and es tablish its tractability. A key step in the procedures developed in [18] was the computation of a priority ranking z+ on the rules in the knowledge base, which was conjectured to be intractable. In Section 3 (after some preliminary definitions in Section 2), we present a pr ? cedure for computing z+ that requires a poly llOITIIal number of propositional satisfiability tests and hence is tractable in applications permitting restricted languages, such as Horn expressions, network theories, or acyclic databases.
The second contribution of this paper is to equip �ystem-Z� with � he capability to reason with soft ev tdenc � ?r 1 � n � ree�se observations (Section 4). Such a capab1hty 1s Important when we wish to assess the plausibility of u (using Principle 3 above) but the con text ¢ is not given with absolute certainty . In other words, there is some vague testimony supporting ,p but th � t testimony is undisclosed (or cannot be articulated usmg the basic propositions in our language, e.g., tes tunony of the senses); all that can be ascertained is a summary of that testimony saying that ",P is supported to a. degre � n." We propose two different strategies for computmg a new ranking �<' from an initial one 1£ ' given soft evidential report supporting a wff 4J. The first strategy, named J-conditionalization, is based on Jeffrey's Rule of Conditioning [24] . It interprets the re port as specifying that "all things considered," the new degree of disbelief for -.¢should be �>'(-.¢ ) = n. The second strategy, named L-conditionalization, is based on the virtual evidence proposal described in [2 3 ] . It interprets the report as specifying the desired sllift in the degree of belief in ¢ , as warranted by that report alone and "nothing else considered." We show that L-conditionalization has roughly the same complexity as ordinary conditionalization, and then we relate our formalism to the theory of belief revision in [2 ] . Fi nally, Section 5 summarizes the mai1: ::esults. 
Similarly, given two wffs 'P and 1j; such that r.p is sat isfiable , we define the conditional ranking ��: 
"' F"''""''
The recursive nature between Eqs. 6 and 7 is be nign, and we present an effective procedure, Procedure
Z_rank, for computing z+ in the next section. In [18] , we also show that Eqs. 6 and 7 define a unique admis sible ranking function ,.+ that is minimal in the fol lowing sense: Any other admissible ranking function must assign a higher ranking to at least one world and a lower ranking to none.
An alternative mechanism for enriching the original specification of a ranking (probability) function in the form of a set of conditional if-then rules is studied in [17 ] , where Maximum Entropy principle is used to select a privileged distribution among those probabil ity distributions complying with the constraints im posed by the rules. In the language of rankings, this distribution can be represented as a set of recursive equations similar to Eqs. 6 and 7:3
,.
• ( w ) answering procedures for the ma.ximum entropy ap proach has been proven to be NP-hard even for Horn clauses (see [4] ). to an entailment relation called e:-semantics [23] , 0-entailment [25], and r-entailment (20] , which is recog nized as being too conservative. The approach we take here is to select a distinguished admissible ranking, in our case ��: + , and declare u as a plausible conclusion of �given¢, written¢ kr -y, iff K+ ( ¢ 1\ ff\ < ��:+(¢/\•0").4 According to Eq. 6 i n Def. 2.3, both ��: + and I+ can be computed eff ectively once the priori ty rank ing z+ on rules is known. We next present a pro cedure for computing z+' which is identical to the one presented in [18] save for the crucial computation of Eq. 9 (Step 3(b) ). Whereas in [18] this computa tion was thought to require an exponential search over worlds, we now show that it can be accomplished in 0(1�1 x log 1�1) satisfiability tests. •u we are concerned with the strength fJ wit.h which the conclusion is endorsed, then¢> J{-"I iff,.. +(¢> Au)+ fJ < K+(!/1 A -.u).
!>The notion of toleration is also crucial for deciding con sistency: ll. is consistent iff there is a tolerated default rule in every nonempty subset ll.' of ll. (Theorem 1, [18] The i dea is to perform a binary search on � to find the l owest Z(1·) such that there is a model for¢ that does not violate any rule r1 with priority Z(r1) 2:: Z(t•). This is done by dividing � into two roughly equal sections: top-half (rmid to Thi g h) and bottom half (rrow to rmid )· A satisfiability test on the wff a = ¢ /\� �� •i d 'P i :J tPi decides on whether the search should continue (in a recursive fashion) on the bottom half or on the top-half. 7 Lemma 3.3 The value of Z(¢ .!... . O" ) in Eq. 9 can be computed in O(log IRZ+I) satisfiability tests.
Let �� in Step 3(a) be equal to {'Pi � 1/J;}; the com putation of Eq. 9 is equivalent to computing the 11: of t he wff O" 1\ ¢ /\i cp; ::> tPi where i ranges over all the rul es in f:.. ', by performing the binary search on the set n.z+. Computi ng Eq. 9 i n Step 3(b) can be done in O(log 1nz+ I) satisfiability tests according to Lemma 3.3, 8 and since it will be executed at most 0(1 �1) times, it requires a total of 0(1�1 x log 1�1). Loop 3 i s performed at most 1�1-l�ol times, hence the whole computation of the priorities z+ on rules re quires a total of 0(1 �12 x l og I� I) satisfiability tests.9
Once z+ is known, determining the strength fJ with which an arbitrary query O" is conf i rmed, given the information ¢, r equires O(log 1�1) satisfiability tests: 10We remark that evidence in this paper is regarded as setting the context of a query and not as a modifier of the knowledge in �-Statistical methods for •.l1e later task are explored in [3] .
This proposal has several shortcomings, however.
First, the net impact of our new rule Obs1 � M would be sensitive to previously collected information about Mary's intentions (say she has bought a plane ticket) that we may wish to suppress. In other words, we of ten wish to express the assessment that, all things considered, Mary's going to the party is believed to degree!(. Second, in many systems it is convenient to treat if then rules as a stable part of our knowledge, unper turbed by observations made about a particular indi vidual or in any specific set of circumstances. This permit.s us to compile rules into a structure that al lows efficient query processing. Adding query-induced rules to the knowledge base will neutralize this facility.
Finally, mles and observations combine differently:
The latter should accumulate the former do not. For example, if we have two rules a � c and b � c and we observe a and b, system-z+ would believe c to a degree max(61, 62). However, if a and b provide two in dependent reasons for believing c, the two observations together should endow c with a belief that is stronger than any one component in isolation. To incorporate such cumulative pooling of evidence, we must encode the assumption that a and b are conditionally indepen dent (given cj, which is not automatically embodied in system-z+ .1
To avoid these complications, the method we propose treats imprecise observations by invoking specialized conditioning operators, unconstrained by a rule's se mantics. We distinguish between two types of eviden tial reports:
1. Type-J: "All things considered," our current belief in ifJ should become J.
2. Type-L: "Nothing else considered," our current belief in ¢ should shift by L.
4.1
Type-J: All Things Considered
Let ¢ be the wff representing the event whose belief we wish to update so that ,._, ( -.. Jeffrey's rule is based on the assumption that while the observation changed the agent's degree of belief in ¢ and in certain other proposition, it did not change the conditional degree of belief in any propositions on the evidence ¢ or on the evidence -..p [24] . Thus, letting P' denote the agent's probability distribution after the report on the value of P'( ifJ) is incorporated, 11The assumptions of conditional independence among converging rules is embodied in the formalism of Maximum Entropy [17] .
12This is an immediate consequence of the semantics for ra.nkings and corresponds to the normalization in proba bility theory (see Eq. 2).
and, using P to denote the agent's probability distri bution prior to this report, we have13 P' ( t/>1 ¢ ) = P ( '¢1 ¢ ) and P ' (¢1 • ¢ ) = P (t,b l •¢ ) , (12) which leads to Jeffrey's rule, (13) Translated into the language of rankings {using Eqs. 1-3) , Eq. 13 yields K1(1/>) = min [ n: ( ¢•1 ¢) + n:'(¢); �e ( ¢1 -.., 9) + n:'( • ¢ ) ] , ( 1 4) which offers a convenient way of computing��:'(�·) once we specify N.'(¢) = 0 and 1i.1(•ifJ) = J. Eq. 14 assumes the an especially attractive form when computing the ��:
' of a world w:
Eq. 15 corresponds exactly to the a-conditionalization proposed in Spohn [ 29] ( Def. 6, p. 117), with a= J. If �>. ' (..., 4>) = oo, this process is equivalent to ordinary Bayesian conditionalization, since k'(w) = k(wl¢) if w I=¢ and ��:
' (w) = oo otherwise. Note, however, that in general this conditionalization is not commutative; if 'Pl and ¢z are mutually dependent (i.e., ��: ( ¢zl ¢11 ) :f. "-(¢�2)),14 the order in which we establish t.:(•¢t ) = J1 and ��: ( -.¢2) = h might make a difference in our final belief state, represented by the ranking k".15
Type-L Reports: Nothing Else Considered
L-conditionalization is appropriate for evidential re ports of the type "a new evidence was obtained which, by its own merit, would support ¢ to degree L." Un like J-conditionalization, the degree L now specifies changes in the belief of ¢, not the absolute value of the final belief in ,P. As in the case of type-J reports, we assume that in naming ¢ as the dit· ect benefi ciary of the evidence, the intent is to convey the assumption of conditional independence, as formulated in Eq. 13. Next, we assume that the degree of support L charac terizes the likelihood -ratio ..\ ( ifJ) associated with some undisclosed observation Obs, as is done in the method of virtual conditionalizati on [23) :
13Eq. 12 is known as the J-cor1dition (24].
(16) 14Tbis condition mirrors probabilistic dependence, i.e., P(.P2i.Pd ;f; P(¢12).
lf>Spohn ( (29] , p. 118) has acknowledg, c1 the desirability of commutativity in evidence pooling but has not stressed that a-conditionalization commutes only in a very narrow set of circumstances (partially specified by his Theorem 4). These circumstances require that. successive pieces of evidence support only propositions that are relatively inde pendent -the truth of one proposition should not imply a belief in another. Shenoy [2i) has corrected this deficiency by devising a commutative combiuation rule which behaves similar to 1-conditiouing. · which governs the updates via the product rule P' ( <l>) ..\ ( ¢)?(¢) -:::-: P , -:--( ...,....,. .,. . cP )
Translated into the language of rankings, this assump tion yields
and, since either "'(cfo) or K1(•<P) must be zero, we ob tain
We see that the effect of L-conditionalization is to shift the degree of disbelief difference between ¢ and -.,p by the specified amount L. Once"' ( ¢) is known, we can use Jeff rey's rule ( Eq. 14) to compute the t.:'(¢) for an arbitrary wff 1/!, we have that��:
depending on whether ��: ( •ifJ )+�i( <P) is less than, greater than, or equal to L. This expression takes the following form for ��:'(w):
depending on whether w )= ¢> or w )= •¢1. As in J conditionalization, if L = oo then ��:. ' (w) = K ( wl</1). For the general case, we can see that the effect of L-conditionalization is to shift downward the K of all worlds that are models of the supported proposition ,P relaLive to the ,; of all worlds that are not models for <,b. However, unlike J-conditionalization, the net rela tive shift is constaut and is equal to L, independent of the initial value of x( ¢ ). It is easy to verify that L-conditionalization is commutative (as is its proba bilistic counterpart, see Eq. 17), and hence it permits a recursive implementation in the case of multiple ev idence.
We can illustrate these updating schemes through the party example consisting of the single rule rm : M � -.B (''if Mary goes to the part.y, then Bill will not go"). A trivial application of Procedure Z_rank yields z+(,·m) = 4, and using Eqs. 4 and 6 we find x:(x) = 0 for every proposition x, except x = B A fl,f, for which we have x+(!vf A B) = 5. This means that we have no reason to believe that either Mary or Bill will go to the party, but we are pretty sure that both of them will not show up. Now suppose we see that Mary is very well dressed, and this observation makes our be lief in I\1 increase to 3, that is, ��:+' (--,Af) = 3. As a consequence, our belief in Bill staying home also in creases to 3 since, using either J-conditionalization or L-conditionalization, ��:+'(B) = 3. Next, suppose that someone tells us that he has a strong hunch that Bill plans to show up for the party, but he fails to tell us why. There are two ways in which this report can influ ence our beliefs. The natural way would be to assume that our informer has not seen Ivlary's dress, and might not even be aware of Bill and Mary'" relationshiphence we assess the impact of his report in isolation and say that whatever the value of our current belief in Bill going, it should increase by 3 increments, or fj + " L = 3. Following Eq. 21, ��:+ (B) and K (-.M) will both be equal to 0, and we are back to the initial un certainty about Bill or Mary going to the party, except that our disbelief in both :Mary and Bill being at the party has decreased to ,_+" (M /1. B) = 2. The second way would be to assume that our informer is omni scient and already has taken into consideration all we know about Bill and Mary. He means for us to revise our rankings so that the final belief in ''Bill going" will be fixed at ��:+" (-.B) = 3. With this interpretation, we J-condition ��: + ' on the proposition ¢= -.B and obtain ,;; +" (M) = 3, concluding that it is Mary who will not show up to the party after all.
4.3
Complexity Analysis
From Eq. 14 we see that x:'('l/.') can b• computed from x:(tf>i¢) and ��:(¥>1•¢), which, assuming we have z+ , requires a logarithmic number of propositional satisfi ability tests (see Section 3). L-conditionalization can follow a similar route, as depicted in Eq. 21.
Special precautions must be taken when simultaneous, multiple pieces of evidence become available. First, J conditionalization is not commutative, hence we can not simply compute ,;,' by J-conditioning on ¢1 and then J-conditioning K1 on 1>2 to get. K-11 • We must J condition simultaneously on ¢1 and ¢2 with their re spective J-levels, say h and Jz . Worse yet, an auxil iary effort must be expended to compute the J-level of each combination of ¢'s, in our case ¢1 /1. ¢z, ¢ 1 1\ •¢2, etc. This is no doubt a hopeless computation when the number of observations is large. 1-conditionalization, by virtue of it.s commutativity, enjoys the benefits of recursive computations. Let e1 and e2 be two (undisclosed) pieces of evidence sup porting ¢1 (with strength L1 ) and ¢· (with strength L2 ), respectively. We first 1-condittun ,;; on ljJ1 and calculate ��:'(¢1) and ,;:'(¢>2) using Eq. 20 and Eq. 21, respectively. Applying Eq. 21 this time to ,;,1('1/1 1\ ¢2), we calculate ,;; '(tf>l¢2). Second, we L-condition ��:' on ¢2, compute K;11(¢2) using Eq. 20, and, finally, using x:
' ( tf>l ¢ 2) and ,;:"(¢2) in Eq. 21 obtain ,;,"(iJ· )Y' Note that, although each of these calculations requires only O(log I� I) satisfiability tests, this computation is ef fe ctive only when we have a well designated target hypothesis tjJ to est.ima.te. The computation must be repeated each time we change the target hypothesis, even when the context remains unaltered. This is so because we no longer have a facility fo r encoding a 16The generalization to more than two pieces of evidence is straightforward. complete description of x:' , as we had for K (using the z+ -function). Thus, the encoding for K:1 may not be as economical as that fo r K (the number of worlds is astro nomical), unless we manage to find dummy rules that emulate the constraints imposed on ¢1 by the (undis closed) observation. Such dummy rules must enforce the conditional independence constraints embedded in Eq. 13, without violating the admissibility constraints (Eq. 5) in � (see [19] ).
4.4
Relation to the AGM Theory of Revision Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson (AGM) have advanced a set of postulates that have become a stan dard against which proposals for belief revision are tested [ 2] . The AG M approach models epistemic states as deductively closed sets of (believed) sentences and characterizes how a rational agent should change its epistemic states when new beliefs are added, sub stracted, or changed . The central result of this theory is that these postulates are equivalent to the existence of a complete preordering of all propositions according to their degree of epistemic entrenchment such that belief revisions always retain more entrenched propo sitions in preference to less entrenched ones. However, the AGM postulates do not provide a calculus with which one can realize the revision process or even spec ify the content of an epistemic state [5, 11, 22] .
Spohn (29] has shown how belief revision conforming to the AGM postulates can be embodied in the con text of ranking fu nctions. Once we specify a single ranking fu nction K on possible worlds, we can asso ciate the set of beliefs with those propositions tf> fo r which ,;; ( •1/•) > 0. To incorporate a new belief j3, one can raise the x: of all models of -.j3 relative to those of J], until k(-.j3) becomes (at least) 1, at which point the newly shifted ranking defines a new set of belief. <; . This process of belief revision, corresponding to a· -conditioning (with a = 1) was shown to obey the AGM postulates, fr om which it follows that revision in the probabilistic. system described in this paper also obeys those postulates under the same interpretation of beliefs .
Still, neither the AGM theory nor Spohn's embodi ment of the theory are directly applicable to AI sys tems, the fo rmer because it does not provide a finite specification fo r belief sets and their entrenchment or dering, and the latter because it requires an explicit encoding of the ranking function on all possible worlds.
To better model AI practice, Nebel [22) adapted the AGM theory so that finite sets of base propositions mediate revisions. This is exemplified in the nonmono tonic systems of Brewka [7 ] and Poole [ 2 6 ] , where the base consists of propositional implications, or expecta tions [15] . The basic idea in these syntax-based sys tems is to define a (total) priority order on the set of base propositions, and select revisions to be maximally consistent relative to that order . Nebel has shown that such a. strategy, can satisfy almost all the AGM ax-ioms. Boutilier [5] has fu rther shown that, indeed, the priority fu nction z+ corresponds naturally to the epis temic entrenchment ordering of the AGI\1 theory. 17 Unfortunately, even Nebel 's theory does not com pletely succeed at fo rmalizing the practice of belief re vision, as it does not specify how the priority order on the base propositions is to be determined. Although one can imagine, in principle, that the knowledge au thor specify this order in advance, such specification would be impractical, since the order might (and, as we have seen, should) change whenever new rules are added to the knowledge base.
Thus we see that there are several computational and epistemological advantages to our system over those proposed by AG M and Spohn, stemming fmm the fact that our revision process revolves armmd a finite set of conditional rules, not around the beliefs, the rank ings or the expectations that emanate from those rules.
First, since the number of propositions in one's belief set is as tronomical, and so is the number of worlds, it is a computational necessity to base belief revision on rules, whose number is usually manageable. Second, our system extracts both beliefs and rankings of be liefs automatically from the content of 6.; no outside specification of belief orderings is required.
Third, in order to facilitate recovery from obsolete ob servations Spohn's framework must assume that all observations are defeasible (or imprecise), which corre sponds to a-conditioning with a < oo. In our system, we can accommodate both imprecise and precise obser vations (corresponding to a = oo) using ordinary con ditioning. Given a set of precise observations ¢, the set of beliefs is defined as those propositions u for which ,_( --,ul¢) > 0. Retraction of obsolete observations can be done by simply removing those observations from ¢;. This flexibility is fac ilitated by mil ';1taining a fixed set of conditional rules, with the help uf which one can always restore beliefs (and rankings) so that. they re flect the observations at hand, independently of those seen in the past.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, our system is capable of responding not merely to empirical obser vations but also to linguistically transmitted infonna tion such as conditional sentences (i.e., if-then rules). For example, suppose someone tells us that 1\Iary too tries to avoid Bill in parties; we simply add this in formation to our knowledge base in the fo rm of a new rule, B -..., _H , recompute z+ , an d are prepared to respond to new observations or hearsay. In Spohn's system, where revisions are limited to a-conditioning, one cannot properly revise beliefs in response to con- . Boutil •'I" abo shows [6] that an entrenchment ordtriug obeying the AGM frame work obtains from the Z priorities of the negations of the material counterpart of rules. ditional statements.
18
Having the capability of adopting new conditionals (as rules) also provides a simple semantics for interpreting more complex sentences involving conditionals (e.g., "If you wear a helmet whenever you ride a motorcycle, then you wont get hurt badly if you fall" 19). Both nested and negated conditionals cease to be a mystery once we permit explicit references to default rules. Th e sentence "If (a ___. b) then ( c __,. d)" is interpreted as:
"If I add the default a-b to t., the n (c, d) will be in the consequence relation ��of the resulting knowledge base 6.' :::: : t. U {a __,. b} ." which is clearly a proposition that can be tested in the language of default-based ranking systems.
Note the essential distinction between having a condi tional rule a --b explicitly in t. and certifying that 
Conclusions
This paper proposes a belief-revision system that rea sons tractably and plausibly with linguistic quantifica tion of both observational reports (e.g. , "looks like" ) and domain rules (e.g., "typically" ). We have shown that the system is semi-tractable, namely, tractable for every sublanguage in which propositional satisfiabil ity is polynomial (Horn expressions, network theories, acyclic expressions, etc.). To the best of our knowl edge, this is the first system that reasons with approx imate probabilities which offers such broad guarantees of tractability. 21 We expect these results to carry over to the theory of possibility as formulated by Dubois and Prade [12] , which has similar features to Spohn's system except that beliefs are measured on the real interval [0 , 1] . In addition we have shown that, with out loss of tractability, the system can also accommo date expressions of imprecise observations, thus pro18Gardenfors [14] attempts to devise postulates for con ditional sentences, but finds them incompatible with the Ramsey test (page 156-160). See also Boutilier [5] for an analysis of Ramsey test. and the AGM axioms 1� Example due to Calabrese (personal comm unication). 20 Belief revision systems proposed in the database Jit.
erature (1:1, 9] suffer from the same shortcoming. In that context defaults (and conditionals) represent integrity con straints with exceptions. viding a good model fo r weighing the impact of ev idence and counter-evidence on our beliefs. Finally, we have shown that the enterprise of belief revision, as fo rmulated in the work presented in [2] , can find a tractable and natural embodiment in system-z+ , un hindered by difficulties that plagued earlier systems.
